The election followed the mass protests in 2022, which led to Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s removal from office, and held high stakes for New Delhi given India’s substantial geopolitical and security interests in the Indian Ocean region.

In Sri Lanka, New Delhi reportedly preferred the continuity that the incumbent Ranil Wickremesinghe or the pro-India leader of Opposition, Sajith Premadasa, would have offered. According to a Times of India report, this continuity would have enabled New Delhi to further strengthen the goodwill it had established with Sri Lanka during the unprecedented economic crisis of 2022.

However, India chose to adopt a neutral stance in the Sri Lankan elections.

Already locked in contest with long-time strategic rivals China and Pakistan, Dissanayake’s victory in Sri Lanka and Hasina’s exit in Bangladesh leaves New Delhi facing an array of governments in the region that either do not align with its interests, or have leaders at the helm who have been known for pro-China leanings, or are grappling with severe internal challenges.

Against this backdrop, here are the challenges India now faces in its neighbourhood.

Sri Lanka

Prime Minister Narendra Modi congratulated Dissanayake on his electoral success on Monday, expressing hope for further enhancing the multifaceted cooperation between India and Sri Lanka.

Dissanayake, in response, expressed his gratitude to PM Modi for his “kind” words and support, stating that he too was committed to strengthening ties between the two nations. “Together, we can work towards enhancing cooperation for the benefit of our peoples and the entire region,” Dissanayake wrote on the social media platform X ahead of his inauguration.

However, Indian media reports have pointed out Dissanayake’s past pro-China stance, with several of his public comments and decisions having been at odds with India’s interests.

Additionally, his party, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), has historically opposed the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Accord.

The JVP has a history of both anti-India and pro-China positions. Its founder, the late Rohana Wijeweera, is reported to have criticised what he called “Indian expansionism” in the 1980s and even portrayed India as an “enemy” of Sri Lankan interests.

Dissanayake has also resisted calls for inquiries into alleged war crimes during the civil conflict involving the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Sri Lankan forces.

Recently, Dissanayake also attracted attention after announcing plans to cancel a 450 MW wind power project led by Gautam Adani’s Adani Group.

However, according to the Times of India, in discussions with Indian officials, Dissanayake has also raised concerns over corruption and the lack of transparency in some Chinese flagship projects in Sri Lanka. While it is believed in New Delhi that Dissanayake may seek to modify some Indian projects in Sri Lanka, he is unlikely to completely withdraw from any of them.

The Indian diplomatic mission in Colombo is also reportedly maintaining regular contact with Dissanayake.

However, the situation is not as challenging as his past pro-China leanings would suggest. In fact, Dissanayake has indicated his willingness to engage with New Delhi and maintain positive relations, hinting at a potential shift in his approach and a desire to cooperate.

During his campaign, for example, Dissanayake assured that he would not allow Sri Lanka’s sea, land, or airspace to be used to pose a threat to India or regional stability.

Although Dissanayake’s election introduces the challenge of working with a leader who was largely unfamiliar to New Delhi until recently, India’s contribution of over $4.5 billion in economic and humanitarian aid, as well as its support for Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring, in the wake of the 2022 economic crisis, places India in a stronger position than in its recent dealings with Bangladesh.

New Delhi’s outreach to Dissanayake, including hosting him earlier this year, is also expected to be advantageous. In February, Dissanayake visited New Delhi at the invitation of the Indian government, meeting External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. He also expressed an interest in emulating some of India’s socio-economic successes in Sri Lanka and praised India’s role in helping Sri Lanka address its economic crisis after his visit.

In conclusion, while there is speculation that Dissanayake could seek closer ties with China, it appears he is also likely to maintain friendly relations with India, particularly as he faces the task of securing Sri Lanka’s economic recovery.

Bangladesh

In comparison, Sheikh Hasina’s removal from power in Bangladesh was perhaps a more challenging crisis.

Under Hasina’s leadership, Bangladesh was one of the few stable partners for India in the neighbourhood.

Since the start of 2024, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Khaleda Zia, had intensified its anti-India rhetoric, with this sentiment reportedly gaining public support, according to ThePrint.

The BNP’s “India Out” campaign, which included a boycott of Indian goods during Ramadan in April, highlighted the growing anti-India narrative. The BNP, which did not participate in elections earlier this year due to a lack of a caretaker government, has previously fuelled anti-India sentiments too.

The BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami are also believed to have played a role in turning the student-led movement in early July into a nationwide agitation for Hasina’s ouster.

Hasina had been crucial in keeping anti-India forces and religious extremists in Bangladesh at bay. After her ouster, the apprehension in New Delhi would have been that India’s counterterrorism and defence cooperation with Bangladesh could be at risk.

Since Hasina’s rise to power in 2009, India and Bangladesh had worked together to curb anti-India terrorist groups operating from Bangladesh. Both countries were also aligned on addressing the Jamaat threat.

Another key concern for India will be how the new governments in Dhaka and Colombo balance their relationships with New Delhi and Beijing.

Although Hasina maintained strong economic ties with China, she ensured that Chinese investments did not jeopardise India’s security interests in the region.

India may now worry that China could gain a stronger foothold in Bangladesh, as New Delhi is seen as a trusted ally of Hasina’s Awami League.

The former Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Hasina, resigned and fled to India on August 5 after facing an unprecedented student-led protest against her government.

In an interview earlier in September, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar had said that India regards the political instability in Bangladesh as an “internal matter” for the nation, but had added that New Delhi remains keen on preserving the previously stable relationship between the two countries.

Before that, Yunus, who is leading Bangladesh’s interim government, expressed his wish to continue the previously positive relationship with India. However, he emphasised that these relations should be based on “fairness and equality”.

Hasina fled Dhaka aboard a military aircraft and arrived at an Air Force base near Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh. Initially, it was anticipated that she would travel to London to seek political asylum. However, sources within the British Home Office informed Indian media that their regulations do not allow individuals to enter the country for the purpose of seeking asylum or temporary refuge. It is currently believed that Hasina is under the protection of Indian intelligence agencies.

However, her continued stay in India, amid growing calls, albeit unofficial ones, for her extradition and the mounting number of cases against her, could complicate matters for New Delhi when it comes to ensuring stability and continuity in ties with Dhaka.

In a stern message to Hasina, Chief Advisor Yunus has in the recent past insisted that she must remain silent to avoid endangering the relationship between India and Bangladesh until her extradition is requested. “If India wants to keep her till Bangladesh wants her back, the condition would be that she has to keep quiet,” he has asserted.

Maldives

In the Maldives, pro-Beijing Mohamed Muizzu won the presidency in September 2023 after campaigning on an “India Out” platform.

In May 2024, Muizzu began moves to replace India as a security partner and expelled Indian military personnel who were operating aircraft in the Maldives. Following negotiations, the Indian troops were replaced by civilians.

In a clear indication of his pro-Beijing stance, Muizzu refused to renew a hydrographic agreement with India but permitted Chinese research vessels to dock at Maldivian ports, despite New Delhi’s concerns.

Muizzu is also expected to visit India on an official trip “very soon”, according to his spokesperson.

Earlier in September, Maldives Foreign Minister Moosa Zameer acknowledged that relations between the Maldives and India had experienced some difficulties in the early days of President Muizzu’s administration, but emphasised that these “misunderstandings” had since been resolved.

However, Zameer made these comments during a visit to Sri Lanka, where he also underlined the importance of the Maldives’ ties with key allies, including China.

Recently, the Maldives also announced that its free trade agreement with China would come into effect on January 1, 2025, with bilateral trade projected to increase to $1 billion following its implementation.

Clearly, while the Maldives wants stable ties with India, without the heightened tensions seen during the start of Muizzu’s presidency, New Delhi still faces the prospect of growing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean archipelagic state.

Nepal

The new Nepalese Prime Minister, K P Sharma Oli, sworn in for the third time in July, has also maintained a publicly anti-India stance in the past.

During his first term in 2015, Oli prioritised strengthening ties with Beijing and signed agreements on trade and energy supply, while refusing to allow President B D Bhandari to visit India.

Although Oli claimed in 2021 that all misunderstandings with New Delhi had been resolved, he reiterated in July 2024 that Lipulekh, Kalapani, and Limpiyadhura were part of Nepal.

Myanmar

Meanwhile, Myanmar has been mired in civil conflict since 2021, following the return of the military junta to power.

In February, citing security concerns due to insurgent groups along the border, India announced plans to build a fence along its 1,643-kilometre border with Myanmar.

Amid these turbulent changes, and already faced with hostile neighbours like China and Pakistan, India will probably have to walk the diplomatic tightrope in the neighbourhood for some time to come, ensuring that its interests are secured and China does not increase its influence in the region at its expense.